Uranium and Labor by Leeks, Ronald & Hayes, Mark
Sydney, April 1978.
U R A N I U M  A N D  
L A B O R
On 7 November 1983, the 
Hawke Labor government, 
at an ALP caucus meeting, 
voted to allow the develop­
ment o f the Roxby Downs 
uranium mine in South 
Australia and to perm it the 
continuation of the Ranger 
u ra n iu m  m ine In the  
Northern Territory, This 
decision represented a 
significant departure by 
the ALP government from 
what many people thought 
was the  s ta te d  A LP  
uranium platform, phasing 
out existing mines and not 
allowing any new mines to 
proceed. In this article, 
Ronald Leeks and Mark 
Hayes argue that, despite 
government rationalisat­
ions to the con tra ry , 
Australian uranium ex­
ports will contribute to 
nuclear proliferation and 
render support for the 
status quo o f the nuclear 
arms race. .
—  H I I IIH I
R o n a ld  L e e k s  
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On 7 November 1983, the ALP caucus voted to allow the development of the Roxby 
Downs uranium mine in South 
Australia, which can produce gold and 
copper as well as uranium. At the same 
time, the Ranger uranium mine in the 
Northern Territory was allowed to 
continue, out other Northern Territory 
mines were denied permission to 
continue.
This decision on 7 November 1983 
represented a significant departure 
from what many people believed was 
the stated ALP plptform with respect to 
uran ium  m in ing : upon a tta in ing  
government, the ALP would phase out 
uranium mining and not allow new 
mines to proceed.
The decision also represented a 
victory oy 'actions in the ALP led by the 
Prime Minister, Mr. Hawke, and a 
number of Commonwealth depart­
ments which appear to have significant 
bureaucratic 'capital' invested in 
promoting the mining and export of 
Australian uranium.
Pnor to the 7 November caucus 
meeting, a series of discussion and 
position papers were circulated widely 
among caucus members.
These papers were:
1. "Background Paper on Australia and 
In te rn a t io n a l N u c le a r  Is s u e s " , 
prepared by the Department of Foreign 
Affairs. Resources and Energy, and 
Trade, and sometimes referred to as 
the Hayden Paper
2. "Review ot the  A u s tra lia n  Uranium 
Industry — Caucus Discussion Paper 
No. 1" — apparently prepared by the 
Prime Minister's office. This paper will 
hereafter be referred to as the Hawke 
caucus paper.
3. A Case for Honouring Labor's 
Platform to Phase Out Uranium Mining 
and Export", an alternative position 
paoer prepared by a number of ALP 
members of the H ousp  and the Senate 
and dated October 31 1983
A fourth oaper circulated in October 
1983 ana prepared by the Australian 
Democrats, "Why We Must Keep It In 
The Ground: A Case Against Uranium 
Mining and the Nuclear Industry and 
the Alternatives for Australia and the 
W orld’ , is also worth noting in this 
context.
A close reading of these papers 
reveals much about the government's 
decision.
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The Hawke caucus paper clearly indicates that the Prime M in ister1 wants to connect his position o n 1 
uranium mining and export with 
growing public concern over the threat 
of global nuclear war:
The objectives which should be 
common, in o rder of priority, are to 
concentrate our efforts on reducing  
the possioility of nuclear warfare of 
bringing about nuclear disarmament; 
of turning around the expans/on of 
vertical and horizontal proliferation; of 
tackling the problem associated with 
the peaceful use of nuclear power 
inc lud ing  the assoc ia ted  waste  
problem.’
Given the frag ility of world peace and 
the potential fo r nuclear warfare our 
view is that our priorities should be 
focused on the use to which uranium is 
put rather than elim inating our 
supplies from the world cycle.1
The main thrust ol the government 
position, as approved at the 7 
November 1983 caucus meeting, is 
that a withdrawal by Australia as a 
uranium supplier would adversely 
a ffec t th e  in te rn a t io n a l n o n ­
proliferation regime.
THE NON-PROLIFERATION 
REGIME AND SAFEGUARDS
The n a tu re  o f th e  n o n ­proliferation regime has been outlined by Warren H. Donnelly:
Today the world depends upon a loose 
structure of treaty commitments 
verified by international inspection, 
no r to acquire nuclear weaons; 
in fo rm a l and v o lu n ta ry  u n d e r­
standings o f nuclear supplier states to 
limit certain nuclear exports, to require 
safeguards for others, and to lim it their 
nuclear co-operation to the least 
dangerous n uc lea r techno log ies ; 
bilateral agreements between some 
nuclear supplier states and their 
clients; and a general predisposition  
against nuclear weapons '
The International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), based in Vienna, is the 
major operating arm of the non- 
proliferation regime." Its primary 
mandate, however, is to promote 
nuclear power worldwide. The terms of 
the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty assign to the IAEA the 
responsibility over safeguards of 
fissionable material used in civil 
nuclear power programs. The IAEA 
also co-operates with certain regional 
groupings and individual nations in 
providing safeguards.’
A major argument presented in the 
Hawke caucus paper for continued 
Australian uranium supply is the 
leverage Australia could apply in 
promoting safeguards
Withdrawal will bring no benefit to the 
broader questions of non-proliferation  
and the future direction of the industry 
and the arms race
Currently, whatever the lim itations are 
in terms o f controls and safeguards 
they are much tne better for the 
involvement o f Australia, who has 
supplied ana w ill continue to supply, 
even more stringent safeguards.7
T he l im i t a t io n s  o f th o s e  safeguards have Deen docum­ented elsewhere and were 
sufficient for the Ranger Report in 1976 
to give its well known assessment:
The Commission recognises that these 
defects, taken together, are so serious 
that existing safeguards may provide 
only an illusion o f protections
The essential point w>th regard to 
safeguards under the IAEA is stated by 
Donnelly:
Its safeguards cannot control the 
future policies o f states, but only verify 
present activities. The Agency cannot 
physically protect anything but only 
report diversions.'1
Although there are many scenarios 
proposed lor diversion of small and 
large amounts of nuclear material into 
a weapons program this represents 
only a part of the potential problem. A 
m a io r issue tu rn s  a ro u n d  the 
implications for ourcivilisation of large 
amounts of. separated or separable 
p lu to n ium  a ccum u la ting  as the 
n u c le a r  in d u s t ry  e x p a n d s . As 
Donnelly points out:
To give some idea of the quantities of 
plutonium  that could be involved it was 
estimated in *9S0 that as much as 50 
tonnes o f separated plutonium  could  
be on hand hy the year 2000. At 10 kg 
per explosive, this amount could  
produce 5.000 warheads.'0
/ t must be acknowledged that Australia's support of safeguards is essential for as long as the industry 
exists. The real question, then, is this: 
Is the increased measure of influence 
(if any) over safeguards and controls 
obtained on the basis of our export of 
uranium sufficient to justify the 
support Australia thus renders to an 
industry with all its accompanying 
problems?
Not the least of these problems turns 
around the nature of our civilisation in 
the future as the global inventory 
plutonium escalates. Already, clear 
glimpses of that future can be seen," 
A u s tra lia 's  b lanke t rep rocess ing  
approval also ensures that a fair 
proportion of that global inventory of 
pluronium will come from Australian 
uranium.
Whereas the longer-term consequ­
ences of the plutonium economy could 
be ca tas tro ph ic , the im m edia te  
b e n e fits  o f A u s tra lia 's  a lle ge d  
increased influence by maintaining 
u ran ijm  supply appear minimal and 
elusive.
The onus of oroof therefore rests 
with the government. This paper 
contends that it has not proven its 
case.
An additional and key issue turns 
around whether or not the non­
proliferation regime can endure the 
changing pressures being brought to 
bear against it. At the end of a detailed 
examination of this issue, Donnelly 
concludes thus:
To evaluate the changing pressures 
upon the non-proliferation regime is a 
subtective matter. It appears fo the 
author that the balance o f forces 
opposing the regime is rather greater 
than the balance sustaining  if.,?
Not least among the pressures 
opposing the regime is the total lack of 
serious and meaningful disarmament 
initiatives by the nuclear weapon 
states. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT) commits these states to 
effect measures to end the nuclear 
arms race. Unless significant serious 
disarmament initiatives occur, the NPT 
itself is under threat of not oeing 
renegotiated when its term runs out. 
Thus, the global arms race directly 
threatens the likelihood of success of 
the aims and institutions of the non­
proliferation regime.
T hus it can be argued that the impact of the arms race itself undermines the non-prolifer­
ation regime to sucn a degree that 
withdrawal of Australia's uranium from 
the global nuclear fuel cycle is a 
necessity. This would be a clear signal 
to the world that Australia is serious in 
its statements to the effect that the 
global nuclear arms race and the 
escalating threat of nuclear war 
represents an intolerable! situation.
Recent studies released in the 
United States, which have indicated 
that even a so-called ’lim ited nuclear 
war’ could do irreversible catastrophic 
damage to the planetary environment, 
place the nuclear debate into a new 
level. It is now humanity versus the 
global nuclear system.’3 As Jonathan 
Schell put it in The Fate of the Earth: 
"Extinction is not something to 
contemplate, it is something to rebel 
against."
The rhetorical connection of the 
Hawke uranium policy with nuclear 
disarmament joins with the earlier 
propaganda ana sophistry of ’Atoms 
for Peace' which, according to J. 
Robert Oppenheimer, have only an
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"allusive and sentimental" rather than 
a "substantive and functional" link to 
which prooonents of nuclear power 
make ritual obeisance 1S
THE NUCLEAR INDUSTRY 
AND PROLIFERATION
T he Hawke caucus paper reflects a determ inistic resignation to nuclear power as a fact of life:
The position we adopt is not really 
affected by the arguments o f the 
degree o f expansion that may take 
place over the next 20 years. Whether 
there is one new station o ra  thousand 
is not relevant to grappling with the 
central issue o f the existence o f the 
in d u s try  and  its  m o s t c e rta in  
continuation, m some form, at some 
level, for a considerable period of 
time .16
Yet, witnes the approval given to the 
R o x b y  D ow n s  m in e  and  the  
concom itant approval given to Ranger 
to continue mining and export, the 
government is actively supporting the 
nuclear industry. Ranaer has some 
80,000 tonnes of uranium to sell. The 
Roxby Consortium anticipates sefling 
1.2 m illion tonnes of uranium. The 
Hawke caucus paper essentially 
reiterates earlier arguments in favour 
of m ining made during the 1970s:
In not proceeding with Hoxoy Dnwns 
we would be denying the potential of 
an e n o rm o u s  e c o n o m ic  a n d
14
employment benefit to South Australia 
and the country in general.,r
It must therefore be an im plic it part 
ot the Hawke policy to employ wnat- 
ever means are available to actively 
stimulate the global nuclear industry to 
gain as large a share as possible of the 
resulting demand for uranium from 
Roxby Downs and Ranger.
This position must be contrasted 
with that suggested in the principal 
findings ana recommendations of the 
Fox Report
7. P o lic y  resp ec tin g  A us tra lian  
uranium exports, for the time being at 
least, should be based on a fu ll 
recognition of the hazards, dangers 
and problems o f and associated with 
the production of nuclear energy, and 
should therefore seek to lim it or 
restrict expansion o f that p roduction.,s
Similarly Donnelly cites as major 
fa c to rs  w h ich  he assesses as 
su p p o rtin g  the  n o n -p ro life ra tio n  
regime:
A slow-down in nuclear power .... 
W eaknesses in  w o r ld  n u c le a r  
industries .... Nuclear difficulties of 
threshnoid states [a n d ] Diminished 
use o f highly enriched uranium.
Likewise, Holdren examines barriers 
to proliferation and suggests that:
The rate o f increase in the number of 
nuclear armed nations depends on the 
strength of the motivations for nuclear
weapons acquisitions which are 
mainly politica l relative to the height of 
the barriers which are political, 
economic and technical,M
In short, to prevent or minimise the 
risk of proliferation, measures which 
lim it or even reverse development of 
the global nuclear industry are 
desirable. The strengthening of the 
non-proliferation regime is essential 
and can be m ost e f fe c t iv e ly  
accomplished in a contracting rather 
than expanding international nuclear 
industry context. The Hawse policy, by 
granting permission to Roxby Downs, 
thus tota lly contradicts its stated 
d e s ire  to  s tre n g th e n  the  n o n ­
proliferation regime.
In essence, the Hawke policy argues 
that uranium exports enhance our 
position in non-proliferation forums. 
This is the same logic used by nuclear 
weapon na tions to ju s t ify  th e ir  
escalating arsenals to enhance their 
position — negotiating from strength
— at arms control talks.
DETAILS OF THE HAWKE 
URANIUM POLICY
T he formation of the Hawke policy on the m ining and export of Australian uranium rests on a 
n u m b e r o f m a jo r  and m in o r  
hypotheses:
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1. Continued export of uranium 
strengthens Australia's position in the 
forums o f the n o n -p ro life ra tio n  
regime. Withdrawal of supply would 
weaken the government's voice in 
those forums and hence the working of 
the regime
2 Withdrawal Is technically irrelevant 
to the world supply of uranium and the 
ability of governments to make nuclear 
weapons. Withdrawal would only offer 
uranium trade with lessersafeguards.
3 Withdrawal obviates the possible 
use of a threat of non-supply in 
international negotiations in 'related' 
areas such as French nuclear testing 
and waste dumping.
The first point has already been 
discussed in this paper. The second 
and third will now be discussed..
In arguing the second point, the 
Hawke caucus paper observes that:
The potential for weakening controls 
and lessening influence on safeguards 
is starkly illustrated by the attitude of
the Niger Government which sfafes 
that it would supply uranium to the 
devil.
S im ilarly one would not expect high  
standards for supplies from South 
Africa or Namibia.
This is not a simple argument o f saying 
i f  we do not supply it someone else will, 
but rather we are saying it w ill be 
supplied with lessened controls and 
that w ill be our responsibility
This cannot, however, be sustained 
when the facts are examines. Alreadv, 
South Africa, Namibia and Niger 
supply more countries than Australia, 
including those regarded as having a 
high proliferation risk, such as Iraq, 
Libya, Pakistan and Taiwan. (See 
Table.) It is illogical to believe that a 
country which requires uranium and 
has a desire to acquire nuclear 
weapons would choose Australia as a 
supplier over a less strict supplier 
nation.
Also, the important observation 
must be made that competition with 
Australia may in fact force other
S u p p l y  C o u n t r i e s  
a n d  T h e i r  M a r k e t s
Source: Hawke Caucus paper, 
Appendix.
A u s tr a lia So uth A fr i c a
Japan Japan
F.R.G. F.R.G.
France USA
USA France
Sweden Taiwan
Finland Belgium
Belgium Austria
N ig e r Domestic
Japan N a m ib ia
F.R.G. Japan
Iraq F.R.G.
France U.K.
Spain France
Libya Spain
Italy
Pakistan
suppliers to seek and maintain 
co n trac ts  w ith  p ro life ra tio n  risk 
nations.”  This would more likely result 
if they were squeezed out of whatever 
market were available from major 
uranium users which are of a lower 
short term proliferation risk. The 
uranium supply industry is not 
unknown to operate in cartels,23
The th ird substantive point in the 
Hawke uranium policy is the so-called 
'leverage' position, the deficiencies of 
which have already been examined 
elsewhere.*4
The Hawke Caucus paper argues 
that.
We would effectively be forced out of 
the international debate if we withdrew  
from supply. We would not be in a 
position to use the threat o f selective 
non-supply as a weapon against 
nation's intentions such as dumping 
waste in the pacific or continuing with 
nuclear tests.16
The history of such activities — 
selective w ithholding of supply, trade 
boycotts in specific commodities and 
sim ilar activities — is a sorry one. From 
time to time. Third World producer 
nations seeking better prices for 
commodities have banded together to 
form commodity cartels and seek 
higher prices. Invariably, even where a 
number of nations pledge strong 
solidarity to each other, such solidarity 
is sh o rt- live d  o r is eroded by 
s to c k p il in g  o r the se ek ing  o f 
alternative sources of supply by former 
clients.’6
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T he most telling case against the leverage argument, however, comes from "Background Paper 
on A u s tra lian  and In te rn a tio n a l 
Nuclear Issues". The high interconn­
ectedness of the international uranium 
supply routes and the very naiure of 
bilateral and multilateral safeguards 
agreements impede the unilateral 
leverage actions implied in the 
leverage argument:
,4s a m ajor supplier o f nuclear services 
to a ll end-users o f Australian uranium. 
France has a pivotal role in the existing 
safeguards network undar which 
A u s tra lian  u ran ium  is exported . 
France's continuing co-operation is 
essential to the uninterruoted How of 
AONM (Australian Origin Nuclear 
Material) through that network.17 
Withholding uranium supply to France 
for end-use in France in response to 
French nuclear testing in the South 
Pacific would be on grounds unrelated 
to observance by France o f the 
conditions in the Australia/France and 
A u s tra lia /E u ra to m  agreem ents. It 
w o u ld  in v o lv e  d is ru p t in g  the  
A ustralia/France, A ustralia/E uratom  
and Australia/UK agreements.™
possibly lead to pressure tor Australia 
to accept waste for disposal
Economic factors atso play an 
important part m the pressure to 
continue supply Indeed, every time 
this issue is raised, the uranium mining 
industry responds by claim ing that 
ce a s in g  u ra n iu m  s u p p ly  w o u ld  
adversely affect our good international 
standing as a trading partner.31 
Similarly, the Hawke caucus paper 
develops the same theme:
At the IA L P 1 National Conference o f 
m1982, during what was a very traumatic 
'debate, concerns were ac#eguafe/y 
expressed about the effect our 
withdrawal o f supply could have in 
terms of our economic relations. Views 
were expressed that i f  we were 
perceived as unreliable suppliers 
because o f decisions simply not 
understood by other countries, then 
our reliability as a trading partner 
would be undermined.31
Aside from the implied lack of faith in 
Australia's diplomatic representatives 
to adequately explain Australia's 
position overseas, the inadequacy of
t*
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Roxby Downs, 1983.
The "Background Paper" also 
observes tha t 2,600 tonnes of 
yellowcake ordered from Australia 
could easily be obtained by France 
from  other sources and represents 
only about 2 oercent of its civilian 
requirements.29
It thus appears that Australia's 
participation in the nuclear fuel cycle 
puts substantial pressure on Australia 
to continue supply and often relatively 
little pressure on other countries from 
withdrawing that supply.
Indeed even the threat to withdraw 
supply can bring as much or even more 
pressure to bear upon Australia, as the 
"Background Paper" points out:
Total opposition by Australia to the sea 
dumping o f radioactive waste could
this argument has been establ;shed 
elsewhere.51 However, it raises a 
fundamental question with respect to 
the Comonwealth’s capacity to act as 
an independent and sovereign entity 
among the worla community of 
nations, not to mention debate on how 
far a government w ill go to accede to 
industry pressure. In 1976, the Ranger 
Report made the issue very clear 
indeed in its recommendations:
A decision to mine and sell uranium  
should not be made unless the 
Commonwealth Government ensures 
that the Commonwealth can at any 
time, on the basis of consideration of 
the nature discussed in this reoort, 
immediately terminate these activities, 
permanently, indefin itely or tor a 
specified period.34
T hat successive Liberal and now a Labor government allowed an industry to develop which they 
argue cannot be terminated because it 
would seriously affect Australia's 
international economic standing, in 
the light of the above recommend­
ation, undermines the very credib ility 
of government institutions.
A point raised earlier but which was 
not adequately discussed concerns 
the interconnectedness of the m ilitary 
and civilian nuclear fuel cycles. 
Exporting uranium to nuclear weapons 
countries raises serious questions 
about how much direct and indirect 
support is rendered to their m ilitary 
nuclear fuel cycle and weapons 
production system. As the case of 
India demonstrates, acquiring fuel- 
grade nuclear material may well 
release weapnns-grade material which 
can then be diverted to a weapons 
program.35 Similarly, as nations such 
as the USA and France continue to 
escalate  th e ir  nuc lea r arsenals, 
purchasing uranium from nations such 
as Australia for civilian use could well 
release local nuclear materials for 
5 domestic reprocessing and tnence into 
I  weapons. Alternatively, in increasing 
10 Australian uranium supply by allowing 
Roxby Downs to proceed will result in 
further over-supply of the market 
resulting in both increased availability 
generally and 'ower prices for m ilitary- 
destined uranium from less strict 
suppliers such as Namibia and Niger.
Blanket reprocessing of Australian 
uranium must, in general, help the 
plutonium market such as exists 
between the USA and the UK, though it 
is claimed that this trade serves only 
civilian nuclear power development. 
A c c u ra te ly  assess ing  tne  r isks  
involved in this trade and the 
stockpiling o< plutonium is d ifficult 
because the IAEA Statute precludes 
the release from that source of any 
information concerning the status and 
quantities of weapon-grade material 
such as plutonium in the civil nuclear 
fuel cycle.36
This discussion about the plutonium 
economy highlights the tragic fact that 
the real responsibility of disarmament 
is seen as virtually non-existent. It is for 
this reason that there is no felt need in 
the political debate for consideration 
of the option of a transfer of plutonium 
ano highly enriched uranium from the 
m ilitary to civilian nuclear cycles.
Such ultimate pessimism about the 
possibility of disarmament as a real 
and viable option is reflected in the 
"Background Paper"
It cannof be conclusively demon­
strated that the supply of Australian 
uranium to the civil cycles o f the 
nuclear weapon states wouid not
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'release other origin uranium, not 
subject to a peaceful non-explosive 
pledge, from the civil cycle to the 
military. It is d ifficult, however, to 
sustain any argument that it could so 
're lease ' o th e r  o r ig in  u ra n iu m , 
principally because the particular 
requirements o f the nuclear weapons 
states, both in terms o f quantities of 
nuclear material required and the need 
for absolute assurance of suprly< 
would demana that they obtain that 
material from sources which provide 
long-term security and reliab ility of 
supply and which do no t attract 
safeguards at any stage o f its 
processing and use.37
In accenting the m ilitary nuclear fuel 
and weapons cycle as an immutaole 
and unchallengeable fact upon which 
the supply of Australian uranium can 
have no effect, the Hawke policy 
s u p p o rts  w h a t a m o u n ts  to  a 
conspiracy of silence which stifles 
public debate on a critical connection 
to the nuclear arms race.
AN ALTERNATIVE 
URANIUM POLICY
Mk well-known statement from the 
Ranger Report has as much 
relevance for us today as it did in
1976:
The n uc lea r powe in d u s try  is 
unintentionally contributing to an 
increased risk of nuclear war. This is 
the most serious hazard associated 
with the industry.36
W.th the release of the US reports on 
the long-term environmental effects of 
global nuclear war in late 1983, the 
issue is increased in urgency.39 
Simultaneously, the global nuclear 
arms race has significantly escalated. 
The "Background Paper" contains a 
section headed:
Degree o f Australia's influence on 
non-proliferation paradoxically relates 
to role as urctnium supplier under strict 
conditions
Similarly, the Hawke caucus paper 
notes that ....
Having supplied uranium, we have the 
Catch-27' situation o f beu}g morally 
responsible for Australian uranium  
currently in the world fuel cycle.'"
The critical and growing danger of 
global nuclear war impels this country 
to avoid paradoxical and 'Catch-22' 
situations inherent In the continued 
mining and export of uranium.
It has already been argued that a 
moratorium on uranium exports 
consistent w ith ALP policy would 
signal to the international community 
the seriousness with which Australia 
views the escalating arms race. This 
policy would also place Australia in the 
c o n te x t  o f  s u p p o r t in g  n o n ­
proliferation.
T here are five measures which c a n  be s im u l ta n e o u s ly  undertaken bv Australia which 
form the basis of a viable policy to 
reduce the risk of nuclear disaster. 
These are:
1. A moratorium on any new uranium 
mining developments and the export of 
uranium. This can be justified to the 
international community on the bases 
of all the oroblems associated with the 
nuclear industry, and in particular the 
adverse impact of the arms race on 
measures to lim it nuclear proliferation 
and the catastrophic consequences 
which would result from global nuclear 
war.
2. A reaffirmation and extension of 
measures to effect recommendations 
13, 14 and 15 of the Ranger Uranium 
Environmental Inquiry.
13. S teps sh o u ld  be taken 
immediately to institute full and 
energetic programmes of research 
and development into (a) liquid 
fuels to replace petroleum, and (b) 
energy sources other than fossil 
fuels and nuclear fission.
14. A p rogram m e o f energy 
conservation should be instituted 
nationally.
15. The policy of the Government 
should take into account the 
importance to Australia, and the 
countries of the world, of the 
position of developing countries 
concerning energy needs and 
resources."
3. T h e  e s ta b l is h m e n t  o f an 
Environmental Inquiry on Roxby 
D ow ns in accordance  w ith  the 
Environmental Protection (Impact of 
Proposals) Act of 1974 to be 
corductea under terms of reference at 
least as broad as those of the Ranger 
Inquiry. Particular reference should be 
made to the impact of the escalating 
arm s race and re la ted  issues 
subsequent to the Ranger Inquiry, and 
the viability of Roxby Downs w ithout 
uranium processing.
4. The affirmation of a continued 
emphasis of Australian research into 
ra d io a c tiv e  w aste  d is p o s a l, in 
particular the safe and secure disposal 
of high level unreprocessed waste.
It should be noted that a 'so’ution ' to 
waste disposal is unattainable as any 
method developed involves risks and 
costs. However, the large quantities of 
radioactive wastes which have been 
and will be produced by both the 
civilian and m ilitary nuclear cycles 
must eventually oe disposed of. as best 
as possible, for the safety of humanity 
into the future for the reauired 
thousands of years for long-lived 
wastes. Australian participation in this
research therefore need not be 
connected in any way with suDport for 
the nuclear fuel chain, though the 
Hawke policy does imply such 
support. The abandonment of uranium 
supply would also eliminate inevitable 
pressure for Australia to become a 
radioactive waste repository.
5. The Australian Government can and 
should continue support for the non­
proliferation regime. This is possiole 
for ar>y nation with or w ithout nuclear 
developments. As it stands Australia 
w ill have a vested interest in the non- 
p r o l i f e r a t io n  re g im e  b e c a u s e  
Australian uranium is already in the 
global nuclear fuel cycle, and also 
because of continued research into 
radioactive waste disposal and the 
long-term maintenance of uranium 
mine tailings.
i t h d r a w in g  A u s t r a l ia n  
uranium from the global fuel 
cycle will not end the arms 
race or end the risk of nuclear 
p ro life ra t io n . H ow ever, such  a 
withdrawal would be part of a process 
already under way to reduce national 
reliance on planned nuclear power, not 
least for environmental and economic 
grounds.43
It would provide inspiration and 
suggestions for action to  people 
throughout the world involved in non­
governmental activities which nave 
caused them to dedicate their lives and 
energies to the cause of peace.
It would also be a source of 
inspiration and the cause of reflection 
by critical thinkers, scholars and 
writers throughout the world, as well as 
tne Australian community as a whole, 
on the vitally important issues of 
looming nuclear war today.
THE HAWKE POLICY AND 
THE AUSTRALIAN PEACE 
MOVEMENT
T his paper has argued strongly th a t  th e  H a w k e  p o l ic y  c o n t r ib u t e s  to  n u c le a r  
proliferation and fails to institute 
measures which could have an 
influence on the cause of world peace 
and disarmament. The Hawke policy 
must therefore be opposed by the 
sections of the peace movement which 
agree with this argument. However, 
the terms in which the policy is formed 
by the Prime Minister offers an 
a d d itio n a l th rea t to the peace 
movement in Australia.
The rhetorical connecting of his 
policy with moves to bring about non­
proliferation and a reversal of the arms 
race, may find some root in a largely 
supportive and uncritical d u d Nc . If the 
public believe, or are led to believe,
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that the government is doing all it can 
in the cause of peace — although it 
actually supports the status quo — 
they w ill remain inactive regardless of 
any personal fear or concern they may 
feel.
T he  H aw ke  u ra n iu m  p o lic y  
effectively clouds and confuses the 
issues, maxing the public debate both 
mucn more d ifficu lt and retarded in the 
development of its focus Many people 
will suffer an almost schizophrenic 
debilitation as they try to reconcile 
what common sense demands with 
c o n t r a r y  g o v e rn m e n t a c t io n s  
defended by loquacious government 
spokespersons. The political effect on 
the peace movement of a victory within 
the ALP at its forthcoming National 
Conference in July 1984 by the HawKe 
policy and its supporters is beyond the 
scope of this paper. -------------
It is clear, however, that the peace 
movement w ill su^er a significant loss 
of support w ithin the community if 
the Hawke uranium policy wins the 
day.
We believe the peace movement 
must lace this challenge urgently TMt t i t C/e twc been published In Me 
CANP Ncw*lett*f. PO Box 235. North 
Quay 4000 and C»«/n Reaction, 
Room 14, Floor 4, 37 Swtmaton Sfreef. Melbourne 3000. ___
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